St. John's Law Review
Volume 39
Number 1 Volume 39, December 1964, Number
1

Article 31

Tests for Jurisdiction
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1964]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

Feathers than in Gray, the Singer case goes even further than
Feathers. Although both cases involved a defective instrumentality
which found its way into New York, the Singer case involved
no injury in New York. What was important in Singer was that
plaintiff came into possession of the hammer while it was still
in circulation in New York. This, for the court, was an
"essential nexus to sustain jurisdiction." 71 The tortious act was
held to have continued so long as the defective hammer circulated
in New York. Once the user came into possession of the product
in New York, it was immaterial where he took it. However, the
court further indicated that if plaintiff had been given the hammer
in Connecticut rather than in New York, the cause of action
would have had no relation to the tortious act committed in
New York, namely, the circulation of the defective hammer. The
court made note of the fact that defendant had made various
transactions of business in New York, for example, sending salesmen and catalogues into the state, but this was not the deciding
factor in the case. The court indicated' that due process considerations would be more restrictive if the case involved a
"transaction of business" question (CPLR 302(a) (1)), but that
when a dangerous instrumentality is involved (producing a tortious
act under CPLR 302(a)(2)) the responsibility should be greater.
In the Feathers case, defendant's sole contact with the state
was the entry into the borders of New York of its cargo pressure
tank. Defendant apparently had never engaged in any business
activity in New York. Nevertheless, the court sustained jurisdiction, stating that "jurisdiction of a State may be extended
over a foreign corporation where 'single or occasional acts . . .
because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation
liable to suit' on causes of action arising therefrom." 72
Tests for jurisdiction.
When a non-domiciliary knows or ought to know that his

product will find its way into New York, he should be compelled
to answer here for any damage caused by his negligent act
in the manufacture of that product. 73 However, the nature of
the product is an important factor. It is questionable whether the
courts would, or could entertain jurisdiction if the product happens
to be defective yarn,7 4 which is not inherently dangerous, as
Singer v. Walker, supra note 67, at 290, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 69, at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551;
see 73International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., supra note 66; Fornabaio v. Swissair Transp. Co., supra note 66.
74 Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956).
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opposed to a hammer or a tank loaded with gas, which would
be dangerous to life and property if negligently manufactured.
Another consideration is whether the defendant is obtaining the
benefit and protection of the state's laws.7 5 For example, nonresident motorist statutes have been upheld on the ground that
one who enjoys the benefits of the state's highways should be
compelled to answer for his negligent act in operating such a
dangerous instrumentality as an automobile in that state.7 6 The
"balance of convenience" test is another factor to be weighed
carefully. If several plaintiffs have a cause of action against
a non-resident corporation, it may be less inconvenient for the
corporation to defend in a jurisdiction foreign to it than to force
individual plaintiffs to pursue defendant in a jurisdiction where
the corporation is present.7 7 But if, on all of the facts, the
burden placed on the defendant would be disproportionate to the
convenience afforded the plaintiff, defendant should not be subjected
to jurisdiction in the forum state.
Complaint must allege a cause of action arising from the acts
enumerated in section 302.
Lebensfeld v. Tuch 71 was an action by plaintiffs to rescind a
sale of assets and recover them from a non-resident defendant as
constructive trustee thereof. The defendant, Weisz, was personally
served in California pursuant to section 302 (a) (2). He was
charged with receiving assets from defendant Tuch, knowing that
Tuch had defrauded plaintiff of these assets in New York. The
complaint did not allege that Tuch acted as the agent of Weisz.
The court dismissed the action against Weisz on the ground that
"if at the time of service, no cause of action based on an
act specified in CPLR 302 was asserted against Weisz, no
personal jurisdiction of Weisz was obtained."
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The court further stated that since it had no jurisdiction
in the first place, it could not grant leave to amend the complaint
because it was defective when it was made. Here summons and
complaint were served together. The court indicated that it might
have allowed the amendment had the summons been served alone,
because the action would not have been, in effect, contaminated in
such instance by a complaint which did not on its face show
jurisdiction under CPLR 302. That aspect of the court's holding
seems unduly technical. While it is salutary to allege in the
complaint the ground of jurisdiction relied upon under CPLR 302,
776 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 72, at 319.

Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
7 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
7843 Misc. 2d 919, 252 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct 1964).
791d.

at 921, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 596.

